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GOVERNMENT DEFICIT SUSTAINABILITY, AND MONETARY 
VERSUS FISCAL DOMINANCE: THE CASE OF SPAIN, 1850-
2000 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we provide a test of the sustainability of the Spanish government 
deficit over the period 1850-2000, emphasizing the role played by monetary and 
fiscal dominance in order to get fiscal solvency. Since the condition of fiscal 
solvency was satisfied, government deficit would have been sustainable along 
the sample period. In addition, the whole period can be characterized as one of 
fiscal dominance. 
 
Key words: Fiscal policy, Sustainability, Fiscal Theory of the Price Level, 
Monetary dominance, Fiscal dominance. 
 
 
RESUMEN 
En este artículo, ofrecemos un test de la sostenibilidad del déficit público español 
durante el periodo 1850-2000, haciendo hincapié en el papel desempeñado por 
la dominancia monetaria y fiscal con el fin de obtener la solvencia fiscal. Puesto 
que la condición de la solvencia fiscal estaba satisfecha, el déficit público habría 
sido sostenible a lo largo del período de la muestra. Además, todo el período 
puede ser caracterizado como uno de dominancia fiscal. 
 
Palabras clave: política fiscal, sostenibilidad, Teoría fiscal del nivel de precios, 
dominio monetario, dominancia fiscal. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
he role of fiscal policy goes beyond the traditional stabilization 
function. Questions such as the balancing of budget deficits, the 
interactions between monetary and fiscal policies, and the fiscal 
discipline required in monetary unions, have been also intensively 
discussed in the last decades. In particular, one of the main problems 
concerning fiscal authorities is the sustainability of government deficits, 
which is related to the issue of long-run solvency. A fiscal policy is 
regarded as sustainable when, if maintained in the indefinite future, it 
does not violate the solvency constraint; and a government is said to be 
solvent if the present-value budget constraint, i.e., its intertemporal 
budget constraint (IBC) holds. In other words, the public deficit can be 
sustainable if the government can borrow. However, if the interest rate 
on the government debt exceeds the growth rate of the economy, debt 
dynamics would lead to an ever-increasing ratio of debt to GDP. The 
dynamics of debt accumulation could be stopped only if the ratio of the 
budget deficit to GDP would turn to be a surplus, or if seigniorage were 
allowed for. 
 
As noticed before, the usual procedure in most of the empirical 
contributions on the long-run sustainability of budget deficits consists of 
testing the government’s IBC; a non exhaustive list would include, 
among others, Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Trehan and Walsh (1988, 
1991), Haug (1995), Quintos (1995), Martin (2000) or Bajo-Rubio, 
Díaz-Roldán and Esteve (2008). The results, however, are sometimes 
inconclusive due to differences in the econometric methodology, the 
particular specification of the transversality condition, and the sample 
period used. A common criticism to most of the available literature is 
that the econometric procedures used require a large number of 
observations, which is not usually the case in most tests of the IBC. 
 
On the other hand, the traditional macroeconomic analysis assumes 
that the fiscal authority sets primary surpluses in order to assure fiscal 
solvency, for any path the price level could take. In this way, the 
monetary authority is expected to set the price level, without facing any 
constraint; whereas fiscal authority would adjust, so that the budget 
surplus path would be endogenous. This scenario is referred in the 
literature as the Ricardian or “monetary dominant” (MD) regime. 
However, a new approach has emerged in the 1990s, which assumes 
that fiscal authorities are able to set primary surpluses that follow an 
arbitrary process, not necessarily compatible with solvency. In such a 
context, the budget surplus would be exogenous, and the endogenous 
adjustment of the price level would be required in order to achieve 
fiscal solvency. Hence, in this case the monetary authority could only 
control the timing of inflation. This is the so-called non-Ricardian or 
“fiscal dominant” (FD) regime, and the literature developed on these 
assumptions is referred as the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL). 
T 
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The FTPL builds on the contributions of, among others, Leeper (1991), 
Sims (1994), Woodford (1994, 1995, 2001), and Cochrane (2001, 
2005); a survey is provided in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000), and some 
critical appraisals of the theory can be found, e.g., in McCallum (2001) 
or Buiter (2002). The empirical evidence regarding the FTPL, however, 
is not too abundant; see, e.g., Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Esteve 
(2009) and the references therein. 
 
In this paper, we will try to explore the interactions between monetary 
and fiscal policies in order to get fiscal solvency, for the case of Spain 
over the period 1850-2000. The Spanish economy, characterized by 
chronic government deficits, seems to be an interesting case of study to 
investigate how budget deficits were financed, which will allow us to 
determine the prevailing policy regime along the period of analysis, i.e., 
MD or FD. In a previous paper (Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Esteve, 
2010) we investigated this issue through the estimation of a 
cointegration relationship between government expenditures and 
revenues derived from the IBC, and then analyzed the possibility of 
non-linear behaviour of fiscal authorities through the estimation of a 
threshold cointegration model. In the present paper, however, we will 
first analyze whether public finances are sustainable by examining 
instead the relationship between primary surplus and debt, and then 
investigate how this fiscal sustainability is achieved: i.e., through the 
endogenous adjustment of the primary budget surplus (in an MD 
regime), or through the endogenous adjustment of the price level (in an 
FD regime).  
 
A recent paper by Escario, Gadea and Sabaté (2012) analyzes the same 
topic for mostly the same sample period, using a different methodology, 
namely, multicointegration (see Granger and Lee, 1990). In particular, 
they find the presence of multicointegration between government 
expenditures and revenues (the latter augmented with the monetary 
base growth due to the public sector), with the estimates of the 
parameters that represent the first and second level cointegration 
relation suggesting, respectively, the predominance of deficits, and 
their sustainability over the long run. The authors interpret these 
findings as supporting the view that the monetary financing of deficits 
has played a key role in guaranteeing Spanish fiscal sustainability1. 
These results, in turn, would be in line with those previously obtained, 
using a different approach (i.e., from the estimation of a stationary VAR 
model), in Sabaté, Gadea and Escario (2006) for the shorter period 
1874-1935. 
 
Hence, this paper is intended to provide some additional evidence on 
the sustainability of the Spanish government deficit over the long run, 
in a complementary way to the above mentioned papers, focusing more 
                                               
1  Notice that the approach followed by Escario et al. is a forward-looking one, 
while ours is backward-looking. In the last part of this paper we present, 
though, some additional results using the forward-looking approach of 
Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001); see below. 
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specifically on the role played by monetary and fiscal dominance in 
order to get fiscal solvency, and using a different empirical 
methodology. In particular, we will analyze the relationship between 
primary surplus and debt in the line of Bohn (1998), but incorporating 
the later critique to previous tests on sustainability using cointegration 
techniques, recently developed by this same author in Bohn (2007). In 
addition, we will also perform Granger-causality tests between these 
two variables, since the above method might not be able to distinguish 
properly between an FD and an MD regime (see below). Finally, in order 
to check the robustness of our results, we will present the impulse-
response functions of debt to innovations in the primary surplus, 
following the approach of Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001).   
 
As mentioned before, the empirical analysis will be performed for the 
case of Spain over the period 1850-2000. Recall that a common 
criticism to most tests of the IBC is that the econometric procedures 
used require a large number of observations. Accordingly, the longer 
than usual span of the data (i.e., 150 years) should allow us to obtain 
some more robust results than in most of previous analyses. On the 
other hand, the Spanish case can be of interest given the permanent 
difficulties experienced when balancing the government budget across 
those years. For most of this period, and until the fiscal reform of 1978, 
public revenues proved insufficient to finance even small amounts of 
public expenditures, so deficits became chronic, leading the government 
to a continuous resource to seigniorage.  
 
In section 2, we describe the underlying theoretical framework. Next, in 
section 3 we introduce the empirical methodology, and discuss our 
dataset and the underlying economic background. We present the 
empirical results in section 4. Finally, the main conclusions are 
summarized in section 5. 
  2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
s we have seen, according to the traditional analysis, prices would 
be determined by monetary policy. On the contrary, the FTPL 
develops the idea that sometimes, in order to guarantee fiscal 
solvency, monetary policy would be addressed to accommodate the 
path of expenditures and revenues chosen by the government, even at 
the cost of generating inflation. An antecedent of this claim can be 
found in Sargent and Wallace’s (1981) contribution, where the 
interaction of fiscal and monetary variables in the financing of deficits, 
through taxes and seigniorage, was already analyzed. In this way, fiscal 
solvency can act as a restriction on the policy followed by a central 
bank.  
 
A 
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In order to describe the two possible ways of achieving fiscal 
sustainability, we will make use of the government’s IBC, written in 
terms of GDP shares:  
     
        (1) 
 
where b and s denote, respectively, the public debt and primary 
surplus, both as ratios to GDP; E is the expectations operator; and x 
and r stand, respectively, for the rate of growth of real GDP and the 
real interest rate, both assumed to be constant for simplicity. The 
condition for fiscal sustainability is: 
 
0
1
1
lim 1
1
jtt
j
j
bE
r
x
             (2) 
i.e., the transversality condition; or, equivalently: 
 
1
0
1
1
1
jtt
j
j
t sE
r
x
b              (3) 
i.e., solvency requires that the government must run expected future 
budget surpluses equal, in present-value terms, to the current value of 
its outstanding debt. 
 
Notice that, in equilibrium, the fiscal solvency condition holds under 
both the MD and FD regimes; the difference between the two regimes 
lies in how solvency is achieved. According to the MD regime approach, 
the price level would be determined in the money market, following the 
quantity theory of money, and the primary surplus would adjust 
endogenously to satisfy the IBC. In terms of equation (3), s would be 
set to meet a given b, independently of the price level.  
 
On the other hand, when the FD regime prevails, the primary surplus is 
set exogenously by the government, regardless of the level of public 
debt. In this framework, the price level would adjust in order to assure 
the fulfilment of the IBC. And the main implication for fiscal policy 
would be that government solvency turns to be a sufficient condition for 
price stability.  
 
In terms of equation (3), we can write this latter equation as: 
 
1
0
1
1
1
jtt
j
j
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r
x
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B
            (3’) 
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where B, P, and y denote, respectively, the nominal value of public 
debt, the price level, and real GDP. Then, given B, y, and s, P would 
“jump” to satisfy (3’). In other words, if the market believes the 
government’s commitment when setting s, a value of P will be set so 
that B was not excessive and (3’) could be satisfied. 
 
The underlying assumption of the FTPL is that there are interactions 
between monetary and fiscal policies. In this line, Carlstrom and Fuerst 
(2000) show the restrictions that the government’s budget may place 
on monetary policy. If the policy regime can be qualified as an MD or as 
an FD regime, depends on the particular role played by either the 
monetary or the fiscal authority. So, whether monetary or fiscal policy 
determines prices involves an assumption about which policymaker will 
move first, i.e., the central bank or the fiscal authority. In terms of the 
game theory approach, the solution would be given by the leader-
follower model but, in practice, this is an empirical question. 
3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY, DATA AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
s shown in Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Esteve (2009), the 
empirical literature has usually made use of two approaches to 
test for the prevalence of monetary dominance versus fiscal 
dominance: 
 
(i) The backward-looking approach (e.g., Bohn, 1998), so that, 
in a Ricardian regime, an increase in the previous level of 
debt would result in a larger primary surplus today; i.e., 
tt sb 1 . 
(ii) The forward-looking approach (e.g., Canzoneri, Cumby and 
Diba, 2001), so that, in a Ricardian regime, a larger primary 
surplus today would lead to a reduction in the future level of 
debt; i.e., 1tt
bs
. 
 
According to the first approach, one should estimate a cointegration 
relationship between the primary surplus and the (lagged) level of debt, 
both as ratios to GDP: 
ttt vbs 1             (4) 
 
where νt denotes an error term. In this equation, a positive and 
significant estimate of β would be a sufficient condition for solvency, 
indicating that the government satisfies its present-value budget 
constraint; that is, in terms of the transversality condition, s would be 
set to meet a given b, independently of the price level. Furthermore, in 
accordance with the backward-looking approach, an estimated 0  
A 
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would indicate the prevalence of an MD regime, and an estimated 0  
the prevalence of an FD regime.  
Testing whether 0  from the estimation of (4) or, alternatively, 
whether β′ = 1 from the estimation of a cointegration relationship such 
as: 
revt = α′ + β′expt + εt             (5) 
 
where expt and revt denote the ratios of the government’s total 
expenditures and revenues to GDP, and εt is an error term, are 
customary approaches to test for the sustainability of public finances. 
However, this kind of assessments of fiscal sustainability based on unit 
root and cointegration tests have been recently criticized by Bohn 
(2007), on the grounds that such tests are incapable of rejecting 
sustainability. Specifically, Bohn derives the following three 
propositions, related to the order of integration of debt, primary 
surplus, expenditures, and revenues, in order to verify under which 
conditions the transversality condition and the IBC hold (see Bohn 
(2007) for details): 
 
(i) If bt is integrated of order m, being m positive, then bt satisfies 
the transversality condition, and bt and st satisfy the IBC. 
(ii) If expt and revt are integrated of order mG and mT, respectively, 
where ∆bt = expt − revt; then bt is integrated of order m with m 
 max(mG, mT) + 1, so the transversality condition and the IBC 
hold. 
(iii) If bt and st follow an error-correction specification of the form st 
− ρbt−1 = zt, and zt is integrated of order m for some ρ < 0 such 
that where r is a constant interest rate, then bt 
satisfies the transversality condition and the IBC holds. 
 
We use data on primary (i.e., excluding interest payments) budget 
surplus, and total gross debt, as well as on total revenues and 
expenditures, all of them as percentages of GDP, for the Spanish 
central government (i.e., excluding social security and local and 
regional governments) over the period 1850-2000. Notice that only 
data for the central government are available for the whole period; in 
particular, data on local governments are unavailable until 1958, 
regional governments were just established after the approval of the 
current Constitution in 1978, and social security only began to expand 
after 1967. 
 
The data on the public sector variables come from Comín and Díaz 
(2005), who provide a compilation of a large amount of government 
statistics for the period 1850-2000. As pointed out by these authors, 
the quantitative sources for the Spanish public sector are in general 
both abundant and reliable. From 1850 onwards, after the issuing of a 
law on public accountancy in that year, all the revenues and 
expenditures of the Spanish central government have been registered 
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until 1957 into the Estadísticas de las Cuentas Generales del Estado 
(Statistics of General Accounts of the State). After 1958, these 
Estadísticas collect information about the activities of the general 
government (i.e., also including local and –since the 1980s– regional, 
governments, as well as the social security), and are available through 
the Cuentas de las Administraciones Públicas (Accounts of the General 
Government), published by the Ministry of Finance. Finally, the data on 
GDP have been taken from Prados de la Escosura (2003), who has 
constructed series for the main macroeconomic variables of the Spanish 
economy over the period 1850-2000. 
 
The time evolution of the total and primary government surplus 
(rev−exp and s, respectively) is shown in Figure 1, and that of the total 
gross debt (b) in Figure 2. In the rest of this section, we will provide a 
brief summary of the main developments of Spain’s public finances 
between 1850 and 2000. A more detailed account of the evolution of 
the Spanish public sector over this one-and-a-half-century period can 
be found in Comín (1995, 1996) or Tortella (2000). 
 
In general, the traditional perception among economic historians on the 
role of the Spanish public sector since the beginning of industrialization 
in the early 19th century is rather negative. The continuous difficulties 
experienced by the Spanish public finances to balance the budget have 
been blamed of restricting the capital market for the industry, as well as 
distorting the allocation of resources (as shown, e.g., in the 
development of the railway network); see, for instance, Nadal (1975) or 
Tortella (1973). In fact, Spain had to wait until the restoration of 
democracy after 1977, and especially the integration in the now 
European Union (EU) in 1986, to enjoy a public sector comparable to 
that of the rest of Western Europe.  
 
The end of the Old Regime in Spain was characterized by a deep crisis 
in public finances. The answer to this situation was the 1845 reform, 
which meant the first attempt to build a modern tax system in Spain. 
The tax system that arises from the 1845 reform was based on the 
prevalence of indirect taxes, falling on specific consumption goods, and 
the setting of non-personal or product taxes, proportional and not 
progressive. The advantage of such a system was the simplicity of tax 
collection, but at the cost of an easy tax evasion. The tax system 
established by this reform was long lasting, despite some minor 
reforms. Only after the fiscal reform of 1978, at the time of the 
approval of a new democratic Constitution, the Spanish fiscal system 
can be thought to be comparable to that of the rest of Western Europe. 
The main pillar of this reform was the creation of a modern personal 
income tax, together with a corporate income tax, which was completed 
in 1986 with the introduction of the value added tax at the time of the 
integration into the EU.  
 
As stressed by Comín (1996), over most of the period analyzed the 
Spanish public sector was more concerned with providing a high degree 
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of protection and regulation, in order to favour some particular groups 
and sectors, rather than satisfying collective needs (such as 
infrastructures, or social expenditures). Government expenditure was 
kept at a minimum over the 19th century, and most of the budget was 
assigned to the interest payments on the public debt (see below), as 
well as to paying for the salaries of the civil servants and the military. 
Government expenditure as a ratio to GDP only began to increase in the 
mid-1960s, due to higher spending on education, housing, and social 
security; however, a modern welfare state was not developed due to 
the lack of revenues. The process of modernization of the Spanish 
public sector, coupled with an increase in the functions performed by 
the state, can be dated at the end of the 1970s, in the aftermath of the 
economic crisis of that period, the restoration of democracy and, later 
on, the integration into the EU. As a result, the next years 
contemplated the building of a welfare state on European standards, 
and the development of modern and improved infrastructure. Even so, 
the ratio of government expenditure to GDP is still lower than the EU 
average. 
 
On the other hand, though both revenues and expenditures remained at 
low levels, the former were insufficient to finance even small amounts 
of the latter, so budget deficits dominated over most of the period. The 
immediate consequence of budget deficits was a huge increase in public 
debt. The maximum levels of government debt can be found at the mid 
1870s, following a period of political instability after the so-called 
“Glorious Revolution”, when it amounted to more than 150% of GDP; 
and at the beginning of the 20th century, following the last wars in 
Cuba and the Philippines, reaching more than 125% of GDP. Later on, 
only at the end of the Spanish Civil War and in the mid 1990s (just 
before the fiscal consolidation that allowed Spain to join the European 
monetary union) the ratio debt-GDP reached significant, though lower, 
levels, of around 70% and 60%, respectively. As a by-product of the 
massive levels of public debt, their interest payments represented a 
substantial share of the budget, which can be seen, e.g., in the large 
difference between total and primary government surplus in Figure 1. 
 
After 1850, once the initial effects of the 1845 reform came to an end, 
the growing public deficit was financed by debt issuing, which 
accumulated to that previously existing. This situation made worse from 
the last 1860s, so that at the mid-1870s debt service amounted to 
nearly 40% of total public spending. 
 
It is in this context that the granting to the Bank of Spain of a 
monopoly on the issuance of bank notes in March 1874 can be 
understood. In exchange of this monopoly, the Bank of Spain was 
compelled to finance the public Treasury through discounts and 
advances; and, as a counterpart to these assets, the Bank of Spain will 
issue bank notes. In other words, government debt was directly 
monetized.  
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As a consequence, budget deficits were directly monetized through the 
sales of government bonds to the Bank of Spain. A change in the way in 
which monetization of budget deficits took place was implemented in 
1917. According to the new system, government bonds were sold 
instead to private buyers (mostly private banks), but with the particular 
feature that these bonds could be automatically pledged at the Bank of 
Spain at a lower interest rate than the yield on these bonds paid to 
their owners. As a result, the effect of this procedure on the 
monetization of the deficit was not significantly different.  
 
The situation did not change significantly until 1957, when the system 
of indirect monetization was abolished. Although budget deficits were 
not large after that year, the new way of financing the existing debt 
was introducing mandatory quotas (coeficiente de inversión) through 
which banks were obliged to invest in government bonds. However, 
budget deficits reappeared during the period of transition to democracy 
after the mid 1970s, following the first attempts of building a modern 
welfare state, and the increase in social transfers addressed to alleviate 
the economic crisis of that period. As a result, rising budget deficits 
between 1977 and 1982 led to an ever-increasing indebtedness of the 
public sector, which was financed again via direct monetization by the 
Bank of Spain as before 1917. 
 
Only after 1982, budget deficits were progressively financed in a more 
orthodox way, that is, through the issuing of public debt; and, despite 
the accumulation of debt along the 1980s, this did not prove to be too 
troublesome thanks to the remarkable economic growth experienced 
after joining the EU. Finally, from 1993 on government deficit financing 
by the central bank was explicitly forbidden according to the provisions 
of Article 104a of the Maastricht Treaty, which paved the way for the 
Economic and Monetary Union in the EU. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
e have seen in the previous section how the budget deficits 
registered in the Spanish economy had been highly persistent. 
In addition, when looking into how these deficits were financed, 
the key role (whether directly or indirectly) played by the Bank of Spain 
could lead us to presume that monetary policy had been subordinated 
to the evolution of fiscal policy during most of the period of analysis; for 
a summary and discussion of this issue, see Comín (1996, pp. 157-
158). In this section, we will provide a formal test of the sustainability 
of the Spanish government deficit over the period 1850-2000 following 
the methodology presented at the beginning of section 3; and, more 
importantly, we will analyze the role played by monetary and fiscal 
dominance in order to get fiscal solvency along the period. 
 
W 
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In order to examine the three Bohn’s propositions, we begin by testing 
for the order of integration of the variables bt, expt, and revt, using the 
tests of Ng and Perron (2001). These authors proposed using the tests 
statistics 
GLSMZα  and 
GLS
tMZ , which are modified versions of the 
Z
 
and t
Z
 Phillips-Perron tests; and ADFGLS, a modified version of the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Such modifications improve the tests 
with regard to both size distortions and power. According to the results 
in Table 1, the null hypothesis of no stationarity cannot be rejected, 
independently of the test, for the three series in levels; and the 
presence of two unit roots is clearly rejected at the 1% significance 
level. Therefore, the three series would be concluded to be non-
stationary, and the first two propositions of Bohn (2007) would hold. 
 
Next, we estimate the error-correction specification analogue to (4): 
 
∆st = ω + δ(L)∆bt−1 + ρ(st−1 − α − βbt−2) + γ(L)∆st−1 + ηt           (6) 
 
where ηt is an error term. Phillips and Loretan (1991) suggest that the 
simultaneous estimation of a cointegrating vector and an error-
correction mechanism as in equation (6) should be done using non-
linear least squares (NLS) methods, which provide estimates that are 
asymptotically consistent, normally distributed, and efficient. 
Accordingly, equation (6) has been estimated using one-step NLS. 
 
The results are shown in Table 2 and, as can be seen, the error-
correction coefficient is estimated at 0.21, and the long-run coefficient 
β at 0.02. The two estimates are significant at the 1% level. 
Accordingly, the third proposition of Bohn (2007) would hold, and public 
finances would have been sustainable over the long run. In particular, 
the adjustment of the primary surplus-GDP ratio to a given change in 
the debt-GDP ratio would have had an average half-life of about three 
years2. These results would confirm those found using the more 
traditional approach, i.e., from the estimation of a cointegration 
equation such as (5), in Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Esteve (2010).  
 
Recall that, in addition to implying fiscal solvency, a positive estimate of 
β in equation (6) would indicate, according to the backward-looking 
approach, the prevalence of an MD regime. However, there is a possible 
ambiguity here since, as stressed by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba 
(2001), a positive estimate of β is strictly compatible with the presence 
of both an MD and an FD regime. That is, in an MD regime we would 
observe that an increase in debt in period t would lead to a larger 
primary surplus ex-post; i.e.: 1tt
sb
, which implies an estimated 
0 . Yet, in an FD regime, a decrease in the expected primary surplus 
would lead to a fall in the current debt ratio, through a price increase; 
                                               
2  Computed as log (0.5)/log (1- ρˆ ), where ρˆ  is the estimate of ρ in equation 
(6); in our case, 0.21. 
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i.e.: ttt
bsE 1 , which also implies an estimated 0 . For that 
reason, we will complement the above analysis with Granger-causality 
tests between the primary surplus and debt to GDP ratios. 
In particular, according to Sims, Stock and Watson (1990), if two I(1) 
series Xt and Yt are cointegrated, the relevant regression is the 
following:     
 
                                                                                                   (7)    
                                                                                
 
with an analogous representation holding for Yt as dependent variable. 
Then, to testing for Granger-causality, the null hypotheses would be: (i) 
1 = 0, for the absence of long-run causality; and (ii) 2i = 0, for the 
absence of short-run causality. And the standard F test can be used to 
test for Granger-causality in the short and in the long run. 
 
The results of the Granger-causality test for the variables primary 
budget surplus and government gross debt are presented in Table 3. 
We report F statistics on the null hypotheses 1 = 0 and 2i = 0, from 
the estimation of equation (7) with st and bt−1 alternatively as 
dependent variables. Up to three lags of the first difference of each of 
these variables have been included, and the number of lags has been 
chosen using the Akaike information criterion. The results in Table 3 
indicate the presence of both long-run and short-run Granger-causality 
from primary surplus to debt, which would point to the prevalence of an 
FD regime over the period of analysis. 
 
Finally, in order to offer a more complete picture, we present the results 
from applying the so-called forward-looking approach, following 
Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001). According to these authors, in an 
MD regime a positive innovation in the primary surplus pays off some of 
the debt, so the future level of debt would fall. In turn, in an FD regime 
a positive innovation in the primary surplus should lead to a higher 
future level of debt, via a lower price level. Notice, however, that a 
possible ambiguity can also emerge here since, even if a positive 
innovation in the primary surplus leads to a reduction in the future level 
of debt, this could be compatible with an FD regime. In particular, if 
innovations in the primary surplus were negatively correlated with 
future surpluses, the future level of debt would fall through a rise in the 
price level; and such a case could be justified since a higher surplus 
today might reduce the need of future surpluses.  
 
The impulse-response function of the debt-GDP ratio to innovations in 
the primary surplus-GDP ratio, from an estimated VAR in these two 
variables, is shown in Figure 3 together with ±2 standard errors, over a 
10-year horizon. The VAR was estimated with one lag and a constant; 
up to five lags were tested, and the optimal lag order was selected 
using the Akaike information criterion.  As can be seen in the figure, 
the debt-GDP ratio exhibits a small, but positive, response following an 
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innovation in the surplus-GDP ratio, and then decreases to move 
gradually toward zero. Accordingly, this approach would also indicate 
that an FD regime would have prevailed over the period of analysis.   
5. CONCLUSIONS 
ummarizing our findings, the Spanish government deficit would 
have been sustainable along the period 1850-2000, since the 
condition of fiscal solvency was satisfied, and the whole period can 
be characterized as one of fiscal dominance. In other words, fiscal 
authorities would have set budget deficits exogenously, and the 
endogenous adjustment of the price level was required in order to 
achieve fiscal solvency, so that monetary policy was subordinated to the 
needs of financing the budget deficit. Nevertheless, as shown in Bajo-
Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Esteve (2010), if the deficit was above a certain 
threshold (estimated at around 4.5% of GDP), budget deficits would 
have been cut in order to assure their long-run sustainability. 
 
Our results would support, using an alternative methodology, those of 
Escario, Gadea and Sabaté (2012). These results would also confirm the 
informal evidence provided by economic historians; see, e.g., Tortella 
(2000) or Comín (1995, 1996). The Spanish case seems to be an 
example of how an FD regime is compatible with a sustainable fiscal 
policy; or, from a different point of view, we might conclude that an 
independent monetary policy (or, equivalently, an MD regime) is not a 
necessary condition for achieving fiscal sustainability. 
 
In a related paper (Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Esteve, 2009), no clear 
evidence on the prevalence of a MD or FD regime was found, for the 
case of the EMU countries over the period 1970-2005. On the contrary, 
the evidence in this paper shows that the assertions of the FTPL (or, in 
other words, the prevalence of an FD regime) would be more 
appropriate for a less developed country, with a rather undisciplined 
public sector, unable to collect revenues enough to finance even small 
amounts of expenditure, and compelled to engage in inflationary 
financing of the deficit. This was the case of Spain over most of this 
period, since the development of a public sector comparable to that of 
the rest of Western Europe can be dated only following the restoration 
of democracy after 1977, and especially after joining the EU in 1986.  
 
To conclude, despite our data set ends in 2000, we can derive from our 
results some implications for the current policy debate in Spain. As is 
well known, the combination of several factors, such as the conduct of 
the Fed’s monetary stance, credit market distortions, and an apparently 
boundless financial innovation led to the current financial crisis, started 
in the United States and then transmitted to the rest of the world (Catte 
et al., 2011). Regarding Spain, the global financial crisis, together with 
S 
Government deficit sustainability, and monetary versus fiscal dominance: 
the case of Spain, 1850-2000 
17 
Instituto Universitario de Análisis Económico y Social 
Documento de Trabajo 09/2014, 26 páginas, ISSN: 2172-7856 
some distinctive features in the Spanish case (such as the development 
in previous years of a large real estate bubble), turned into a deep 
recession that ended a period of more than ten years of steady growth. 
As a result, the Spanish government deficit, which had been lower than 
the EU average until 2007 and became even a surplus between 2005 
and 2007, soared dramatically after 2008, reaching 9.4% of GDP at the 
end of 2011. However, government debt levels (68.5% of GDP in 2011) 
are still below the EU average. 
 
Faced to this situation, the Spanish government is currently embarked 
on a policy of strong spending cuts and (to a lower extent) tax 
increases, in order to curb the budget deficit. The results of this and our 
previous paper (Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Esteve, 2010) would 
suggest that, in the long run and even under a FD regime (more typical 
of a less developed country), budget deficits would have been 
sustainable; and they showed a mean-reverting dynamic behavior after 
a certain threshold was reached, which in turn would have assured their 
long-run sustainability. In principle, restoring the sustainability of public 
finances would be constrained by the EMU common monetary policy, 
the lack of nominal exchange rate policy, and the fiscal discipline 
required at the EU level. But an independent monetary policy (or a MD 
regime), on imposing a greater discipline to policymakers, should help 
to achieve fiscal sustainability; in fact, in Spain last years were 
characterized by a MD regime, and this did not prove to be harmful to 
achieve fiscal sustainability (Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Esteve, 
2009). Moreover, the current Spanish fiscal consolidation program for 
the period 2012-2014, aims at a target of 4.5% of GDP in 2013 for the 
budget deficit, i.e., the threshold value obtained in Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-
Roldán and Esteve (2010). However, the risks of pursuing a hard 
consolidation strategy when the economy is under recession should not 
be overlooked. As recently noted by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF, 2012), such policies could deepen the current recession, which in 
turn means an additional obstacle for decreasing the government 
deficit. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Figure 1 
Total and primary government surplus: Spain, 1850-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Total gross debt: Spain, 1850-2000 
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Figure 3 
Response of debt/GDP to primary surplus/GDP from an estimated VAR 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Ng-Perron tests for unit roots 
 
           I(2) vs. I(1) 
 GLSMZα  
GLS
tMZ  
GLSADF  
∆bt 32.66
* 4.03* 4.58* 
∆expt 62.46
* 5.58* 8.54* 
∆revt 72.03
* 6.00* 13.03* 
 
         I(1) vs. I(0) 
 GLSMZα  
GLS
tMZ  
GLSADF  
bt 11.62 2.37 2.40 
expt 7.59 1.85 1.87 
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revt 8.18 1.82 1.83 
 
Notes: 
* denotes significance at the 1% level. The critical values are taken from 
Ng and Perron (2001), Table 1. 
The autoregressive truncation lag has been selected using the modified 
Akaike information criterion, as proposed by Perron and Ng (1996). 
 
 
Table 2 
Estimation of a long-run relationship between st and bt−1 
 
Error-correction coefficient  0.21* 
 ( 3.84) 
Long-run coefficient   0.02* 
  (2.75) 
 
Notes: 
(i) t-statistics in parentheses. 
(ii) * denotes significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Sims-Stock-Watson tests for Granger-causality 
 
H0 st  bt 1 bt 1  st 
1 = 0 77.46
* 1.45 
2i = 0   3.26
** 1.13 
 
Notes: 
(i) The reported values are F-statistics on the null hypotheses 1 = 
0 and 2i = 0, from the estimation of equation (7) in the text using st 
and bt 1 alternatively as dependent variables. 
(ii) * and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively.  
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